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LANDLORDS OF LAST RESORT: SHOULD
THE GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZE THE
MORTGAGES OF PRIVATELY-OWNED,
SMALL MULTIFAMILY
BUILDINGS?
DAVID REISS*
INTRODUCTION
For a large part of the twentieth century, the absence of stable
financing has caused difficulties for owners of small, urban, multi
family buildings.1 Toward the end of the twentieth century, the sec
ondary market for multifamily mortgages matured, which has
increased to some extent the availability of credit for small-apart
ment-building owners.2 At the same time, the small-apartment
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. This Article was presented at West
ern New England College School of Law’s 2008 “Entrepreneurship in a Global Econ
omy” Conference. I would like to thank Stacy Caplow, Arlo Chase, Nestor Davidson,
Steven Dean, and Ken Levy, as well as participants in a Brooklyn Law School faculty
workshop, for helpful comments. I would also like to thank Jason Gang, William Gar
rett, and Philip Tucker for superb research assistance. The author also acknowledges
the support of the Brooklyn Law School Summer Research Stipend Program. Finally, I
would like to thank the staff of the Brooklyn Law School library for help locating a
variety of difficult-to-find sources.
1. See, e.g., GEORGE STERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 196-202 (1966)
(calling for, among other things, longer term mortgage money in order to stabilize ur
ban tenement buildings). Unless otherwise noted, I use the term “multifamily housing”
to refer to buildings containing more than four units. This distinction is necessary be
cause, historically, the Federal Housing Administration, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac
refer to buildings with five or more units as “multifamily” and grouped two- to four-unit
buildings with single-family homes. William Apgar & Shekar Narasimhan, Enhancing
Access to Capital for Smaller Unsubsidized Multifamily Rental Properties 1 (Joint Ctr.
for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Paper No. RR07-8, 2007), available at http://
www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/revisiting_rental_symposium/papers/rr07
8_apgar.pdf. Where noted, I may refer to buildings with two- to four-units as multifam
ily as well. See Emily N. Zietz, Multifamily Housing: A Review of Theory and Evidence,
25 J. REAL EST. RES. 185, 186 (2003) (cataloging various definitions of “multifamily
housing”).
2. Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Meeting Multifamily Housing
Finance Needs During and After the Credit Crisis: A Policy Brief 4 (2009) [hereinafter
MEETING MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS], available at http://
www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/multifamily_housing_finance_needs.pdf
(“The multifamily finance system in the United States is effective, credit-worthy, and
915
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building housing stock is shrinking due to abandonment, demoli
tion, foreclosure, and other causes.3 Because small apartment
buildings house many low-income families, scholars affiliated with
Harvard University’s Joint Center for Housing Studies (the “Joint
Center”) have suggested that financing costs for the owners of such
buildings should be subsidized in order to protect this affordable
housing stock and its occupants. The most well-developed proposal
arising from this sentiment is for the federal government to sponsor
small Real Estate Investment Trusts (S-REITs) to pool ownership
of multiple properties, which would allow small-building owners to
accrue a number of significant government subsidies.4
There is, however, no major market failure in the mortgage
market for small multifamily buildings even though such mortgages
tend to be more expensive than mortgages for large multifamily
buildings.5 Moreover, available subsidies are likely to be used more
efficiently if larger buildings were subsidized because the under
writing of mortgages has high fixed costs.6 Finally, it is unclear if
landlords will pass on a meaningful portion of the subsidy to
tenants. Thus, such a proposal should not be implemented.
This Article has two goals. First, to provide as thorough a his
tory of the small-apartment owner and small multifamily properties
as can be cobbled together from the existing literature. This will fill
the need for a comprehensive overview of this important, yet rela
tively unexplored, portion of the housing stock. And second, to use
the S-REIT proposal as a lens with which to evaluate the role the
government should play in the continued viability of this segment of
the housing stock.
This Article proceeds as follows. First, it describes what little is
known about the owners of small multifamily properties and the
properties themselves. Second, it describes the lending environ
unlike the single-family system has maintained strong underwriting throughout the dec
ade.”). The Joint Center study focuses on the impact of the credit crisis on the multi
family sector. See generally id. This Article does not directly address the impact of the
ongoing credit crisis on the multifamily housing sector. Rather, it addresses structural
issues that preceded—and in all likelihood will follow—the credit crisis.
3. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL
HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY 20 (2008) [hereinafter
AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY], availa
ble at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/rh08_americas_rental_housing/
rh08_americas_rental_housing.pdf.
4. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 115-118 and accompanying text.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 54-55.
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ment faced by real-estate entrepreneurs over the last hundred
years. Finally, it concludes by arguing against proposals to imple
ment affordable housing goals by subsidizing small-apartment
building owners.
I. THE SMALL-MULTIFAMILY-PROPERTY OWNER
SMALL MULTIFAMILY PROPERTY

AND THE

Owners of small, urban, multifamily buildings are often
thought of as “slumlords.” George Sternlieb and Robert Burchell
challenged the image of the “slumlord” as the most appropriate one
to describe the typical small-time landlord.7 This is because the
small-apartment-building owner is not a homogenous category.
While the category does include the archetypical slumlord, it also
includes the occupant-owner of a very small multi-unit building; the
amateur real-estate investor who invests excess capital in a taxadvantaged real-estate transaction; the realtor or other real-estate
professional whose business expands to include management and
ownership of real estate; the first-generation immigrant looking to
enter the middle class through ownership of real estate; the absen
tee, and typically passive, investor; as well as the speculator.8 And
indeed, as the vitality of cities has increased from the mid-twentieth
century to the early twenty-first century, the “slumlord” has begun
7. GEORGE STERNLIEB & ROBERT W. BURCHELL, RESIDENTIAL ABANDONMENT:
THE TENEMENT LANDLORD REVISITED 54 (1973); see also LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, GOV
ERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING: A CENTURY OF FRUSTRATION 39 (1968) (arguing that
the “tenement house movement helped fix [the slumlord] in his permanent position as
an American devil and scapegoat”); Michael A. Stegman, Slumlords and Public Policy,
33 J. AM. INST. PLAN. 419, 421 (1967) (stating that George Sternlieb helps “dispel[ ] the
myth of slumlords as a monolithic group of misanthropes who derive their livelihoods in
units of human suffering rather than in dollars of rental receipts”).
8. See MICHAEL A. STEGMAN, HOUSING INVESTMENT IN THE INNER CITY: THE
DYNAMICS OF DECLINE 27 (1972) (finding a similarly diverse group of landlords, al
though with greater concentration of ownership among real-estate professionals, in
study of Baltimore); STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 121-84 (describing many types of
multifamily-building owners found in his study of Newark); see also FRIEDMAN, supra
note 7 (reviewing studies from multiple jurisdictions that demonstrated that many slum
landlords lived in or near their properties); Alan Mallach, Landlords at the Margins:
Exploring the Dynamics of the One to Four Unit Rental Housing Industry 23 (Joint
Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Paper No. RR07-15, 2007), available at http://
www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/revisiting_rental_symposium/papers/rr07
15_mallach.pdf (arguing that in “the final analysis, there is no such thing as a typical
owner” of one- to four-unit properties). Another often overlooked type of owner is the
“inadvertent” landlord who had initially purchased the rental building (often a singlefamily) as her primary residence, only to move on to another property while retaining
the first as an investment. Id. at 27-28.
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to give way to the “urban pioneer” as a prevailing image we have of
the owner of small, urban rental properties.9
There are few facts that we know about these landlords in gen
eral (a category that also includes owners of single-unit rental
properties).10 Indeed, the absolute breadth of the “landlord” class
seems to bear out the fact that no one stereotype can capture the
9. See STERNLIEB & BURCHELL, supra note 7, at 53 (describing the folk figure of
the slumlord as an “overfed individual” who is “securing a more than adequate return
on his properties”). In the popular imagination, rental housing is most often located in
urban areas. And, indeed, the facts bear this out: more than half of all rental units are
located within ten miles of the central business districts of the ninety-one largest metro
regions in the country. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE
STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 22 (2006) [hereinafter THE STATE OF THE NATION’S
HOUSING (2006)], available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son
2006/son2006.pdf. Moreover, California, Florida, New York, and Texas, the four most
populous states, “account for 41 percent of multifamily properties and 42 percent of
multifamily units.” Amy S. Bogdon & James R. Follain, Multifamily Housing: An Ex
ploratory Analysis Using the 1991 Residential Finance Survey, 7 J. HOUSING RES. 79, 84
(1996). The “urban pioneer” is a bit of catchall slang for those who choose to move to
“transitional areas.” See MICH. DEP’T OF LABOR & ECON. GROWTH, 2005 COOL CIT
IES GRANTS & PLANNING PROGRAMS PRE-BID WORKSHOP FREQUENTLY ASKED QUES
TIONS 1 (2005) (on file with author), defining “urban pioneer” as
a person who had vision for a blighted urban area who moved into the area
and worked to restore the neighborhood. We now think of the term to de
scribe anyone who lives in an urban neighborhood or moves to an urban
neighborhood to either restore or maintain it. Some of those urban pioneers
are empty nesters, young knowledge workers, developers, immigrants, creative
workforce, or persons with passion for their city who believe in building or
rebuilding a vibrant community. No matter what age a person is, one who
moves into a transitional area to be part of the rebirth of that neighborhood.
An urban pioneer can also be a developer who is investing in the
neighborhood.
Id.
10. There is really a surprising lack of research in this area, a problem that goes
back quite far into the twentieth century. See, e.g., J. E. MORTON, URBAN MORTGAGE
LENDING: COMPARATIVE MARKETS AND EXPERIENCE 16 (1956) (noting that it is typi
cally impossible to disaggregate multifamily finance data from commercial and indus
trial finance data); Arthur D. Sporn, Empirical Studies in the Economics of Slum
Ownership, 36 LAND ECON. 333, 333 (1960) (“[S]eriously documented studies of the
economics of owning and renting substandard housing are rare.”); see also James R.
Follain, Some Possible Directions for Research on Multifamily Housing, 5 HOUSING
POL’Y DEBATE, 533, 543 (1994) (noting that academic literature on multifamily housing
and multifamily housing finance is scarce); Kerry D. Vandell, Multifamily Finance: A
Pathway to Housing Goals, a Bridge to Commercial Mortgage Market Efficiency, 11 J.
HOUSING RES. 319, 320 (2000) (noting that there is less data available on conditions in
the multifamily market than on the single-family market); cf. COMMUNITY HOUSING
IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM [CHIP], PHASE 2 STUDY: EXPANDED SURVEY OF OWNERS OF
RENT STABILIZED PROPERTY 14 (2009) (report prepared by Urbanomics, on file with
author) (noting that “[r]elatively little data has been collected on individual owners of
rent stabilized properties throughout [New York] City” and that the present study only
represents the “[Rent Stabilization Association] certified member universe”).
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entirety: some 4.3 million households reported earning rental in
come from a second property (not necessarily multifamily) in the
2001 Residential Finance Survey.11 The survey also found that indi
viduals and married couples owned 19.3 million rental units, includ
ing eighty-four percent of one- to four-unit properties and sixty-five
percent of five- to nineteen-unit properties.12 These owners tend,
unsurprisingly, to be older and wealthier than the general popula
tion at large,13 although a surprisingly large number of owners are
low-income themselves.14
Small “multifamily rentals are likely to be owned by individu
als with few property holdings.”15 Owners of smaller properties
typically manage their properties themselves in order to save on the
11. THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2006), supra note 9, at 23. Of the 4.3
million who earn rental income, 3.4 million report owning only one rental property and
at least one third of that 3.4 million own a single-family rental unit. Id. The 2001 Resi
dential Finance Survey is part of the decennial U.S. Census. See Residential Finance
Survey—Overview, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/rfs/overview.html (last visited
Apr. 2, 2010). It should be noted that there are few sources of data about landlords that
are regularly updated. As such, this Article will make reference to various studies from
the last twenty years. The reader should rely on the older studies with care, as the
multifamily market has changed significantly during that period.
12. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NA
TION’S HOUSING 21 (2007) [hereinafter THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2007)],
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2007/son2007.pdf.
Business organizations and other institutions owned 15.6 million rental units. Id.; JOINT
CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: HOMES
FOR A DIVERSE NATION 22 (2006) [hereinafter AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: HOMES
FOR A DIVERSE NATION], available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/
rh06_americas_rental_housing.pdf (“According to the Property Owners and Managers
Survey (POMS)—perhaps the most comprehensive look at owner characteristics—most
individuals have fewer than ten rental units, and many have just one.”). For a thorough
study of the one- to four-family housing stock, see Mallach, supra note 8. Mallach finds
that “[n]early half of all owners of single family detached rental properties own only a
single property, with another quarter owning two to four properties, while 70 percent of
the owners of two-family rental properties own either one or two properties.” Id. at 19.
Individuals and couples own in excess of eighty percent of all one- to four-family rental
units. Id. at 20; see also LENORE SCHLOMING & SKIP SCHLOMING, THE ROAD HOME:
WORKING WITH SMALL PROPERTY OWNERS TO PRESERVE AND CREATE AFFORDABLE
RENTAL HOUSING, available at http://www.pioneerinstitute.org/pdf/bgc_roadhome.pdf
(last visited Apr. 21, 2010).
13. THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2007), supra note 12, at 21.
14. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NA
TION’S HOUSING 23 (2002) [hereinafter THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2002)],
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/Son2002.pdf (“Many
nonresident owners of nine or fewer rental units have low incomes themselves, with
almost a third reporting annual incomes of under $30,000.”).
15. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NA
TION’S HOUSING 21 (2001) [hereinafter THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2001)],
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/SON2001.pdf.
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fees that would have to be paid to a professional manager.16 That
being said, for most of these owners, managing their properties is at
most a part-time job.17 Not infrequently, they reside in their
properties.18
There is also some useful data about smaller multifamily
properties themselves, as distinct from the owners of such proper
ties.19 These smaller properties make up a large share of the multi
family market: buildings with fewer than fifty units make up 88.5%
of multifamily properties, and those with fewer than twenty units
make up 74.9% of multifamily properties.20 While small buildings
make up the bulk of all multifamily buildings, they make up a much
smaller portion of total multifamily units: only about one-third of
multifamily rental units are in five- to forty-nine-unit buildings.21
Small rental properties tend to be significantly older than
larger ones. Older properties tend to be in poorer condition and
are thus typically more expensive to maintain, with the cost com
pounded by the fact that they typically house lower-income re
sidents.22 Of course, such tenants are less able to pay increased rent
16.
17.

THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2006), supra note 9, at 24.
THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23; see also
MALLACH, supra note 8, at 20 (noting that about three-fourths of owners of one- to
four-family rental units work in a field unrelated to property ownership and only a
handful of such owners earn all of their income from property ownership). A recent
Joint Center paper argues for experimentation with ownership models for smaller
properties as owners of such properties face a host of problems with them. Revisiting
Rental Housing Policy: Observations from a National Summit 17 (Joint Ctr. for Hous.
Studies of Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. W07-2, 2007), available at http://
www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/revisiting_rental_symposium/w07-2_revisit
ing_rental_policy_brief.pdf [hereinafter Revisiting Rental Housing Policy].
18. THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23 (using
1997 data).
19. For a brief history of the multifamily housing stock, see ADRIENNE SCHMITZ
ET AL., MULTIFAMILY HOUSING DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK 8-16 (2000).
20. CHRISTOPHER E. HERBERT, ABT ASSOCS. INC., AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
AVAILABILITY AND COST OF FINANCING FOR SMALL MULTIFAMILY PROPERTIES 5
(2001), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/smallmultifamily.pdf (us
ing data from HUD PROPERTY OWNERS AND MANAGERS SURVEY (1996), http://
www.huduser.org/DATASETS/poms.html).
21. MEETING MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS, supra note 2, at 7.
22. See THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 22-23;
Jack Goodman, Determinants of Operating Costs of Multifamily Rental Housing 20
(Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. W04-7, 2004), avail
able at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/w04-7.pdf (estimating that
utility costs are fifty-five percent less at properties built in 1990s than for similar proper
ties built in 1970s); see also Ann B. Schnare, The Impact of Changes in Multifamily
Housing Finance on Older Urban Areas 4 (Brookings Inst., Ctr. on Urban and Metro.
Policy & Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., 2001), available at http://
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for improved maintenance. The units in this sector thus tend to be
more affordable than units in larger buildings; this affordability is
not surprising given their condition.23 Small multifamily properties
themselves are disproportionately located in communities with
lower-income residents, higher poverty rates, and lower homeown
ership rates.24 This combination of higher operating costs and
lower rents makes smaller multifamily buildings a less attractive in
vestment opportunity, all other things being equal.
The small multifamily subsector offers opportunities to bur
geoning entrepreneurs but also carries great risks.25 As the Joint
Center has noted, many of these units are “owned by individuals
with limited capacity to maintain and manage rental properties.
Moreover, even the most sophisticated owners of smaller rental
properties find it difficult to secure funds to maintain or upgrade
their units.”26
As a result, “[f]or many of these landlords, the ventures are
unprofitable: in 1995, thirty-two percent of owners with fewer than
10 units reported losses on their investments.”27 Given all of this
www.brookings.edu/es/urban/schnarefinal.pdf (noting that households living in the mul
tifamily housing stock tend to be younger and poorer “than the average American
household”). For a discussion of the characteristics of the middle market for rentals,
see JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., MIDDLE MARKET RENTALS:
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT (2004), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/
markets/mmr04-1_middle_market_rentals.pdf.
23. See THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23; Wil
liam Segal, Segmentation in the Multifamily Mortgage Market: Evidence from the Resi
dential Finance Survey, 13 J. HOUSING RES. 175, 178 (2003). The Bureau of the
Census’s 1991 Survey of Residential Finance found that rents in five- to forty-nine-unit
properties were eighty-four percent of rents in larger properties. HERBERT, supra note
20, at 1.
24. Bogdon & Follain, supra note 9, at 114.
25. Owner-occupants of two- to four-unit buildings are more likely to be “urban,
blue-collar, and less affluent than single-family homeowners.” See Mallach, supra note
8, at 21. They are also more likely to be people of color. Id.
26. THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23.
27. THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2001), supra note 15, at 21; see also
Amy S. Bogdon & David C. Ling, The Effects of Property, Owner, Location and Tenant
Characteristics on Multifamily Profitability, 9 J. HOUSING RES. 285, 314 (1998) (a study
of multifamily properties, finding that “[p]roperties held by nonprofits and corporations
are less profitable, all else equal, than those held by other ownership structures”).
Owner-occupiers, however, have fewer losses, with only fourteen percent of them re
porting losses in 1995. Id. The Joint Center analysis does not appear to take into ac
count the extent to which some investors purchase property with the express intent of
incurring operating losses to offset current income and with the hope of future capital
gains. See, e.g., HENRY J. AARON, SHELTER AND SUBSIDIES 66 (1972) (noting that ma
jor tax benefits available to owners of rental property is depreciation deduction in ex
cess of actual decrease in fair market value); Kathy M. Kristof, A Primer on Real Estate
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bad news about owning rental units, it comes as no surprise that
well over half of small nonresident owners would not have pur
chased their properties if they could do it all over again.28 Notwith
standing this state of affairs, landlords of small rental properties
also tend to hold them for a long time, although the speculation
that was rampant in the early 2000s may have altered this pattern.29
While it is unlikely that many small-apartment-building owners
purchase buildings in order to provide affordable housing to lowand moderate-income people, policymakers and affordable-housing
advocates have identified such owners as key players in affordablehousing policy. Indeed, the Joint Center writes that the “fate of the
affordable housing supply . . . relies critically on finding ways to
assist these small property owners in preserving rental buildings.”30
Because of fixed transaction costs, however, it is more expensive on
a per-unit basis—thus much less common—to subsidize owners of
smaller multifamily properties as opposed to owners of larger mul
tifamily properties.31 The Joint Center’s William Apgar and Shekar
Narasimhan argue that because new production is directed at larger
buildings, small multifamily buildings are “at risk of loss to disin
vestment, demolition and abandonment.”32
Tax Breaks, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 2002, at U9 (“[D]epreciation expenses frequently re
flect phantom costs that can be used to shelter otherwise taxable income.”); see also
ANTHONY DOWNS, RENTAL HOUSING IN THE 1980’S 48-49 (1983) (describing taxadvantaged status in the early 1980s of real-estate investments over alternate
investments).
28. THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23. One
imagines that this figure has only increased during the Great Recession.
29. See Mallach, supra note 8, at 22 (finding that the typical owner of one- to
four-unit properties in 2001 has owned property for nine years); see also STERNLIEB &
BURCHELL, supra note 7, at 55 (finding that nearly forty percent of buildings in a study
of Newark “have been in the same hands for eleven or more years”).
30. THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2007), supra note 12, at 22. This is
an issue that disparately impacts communities of color. Id. In 2005, the minority share
of renter households was forty-three percent and growing. Id.
31. THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23 (noting
that “major supply-side housing assistance programs—including the Low-Income Hous
ing Tax Credit—typically provide subsidies to larger properties, even though most rent
ers needing assistance live in smaller properties”); Donald S. Bradley et al., An
Examination of Mortgage Debt Characteristics and Financial Risk Among Multifamily
Properties, 10 J. HOUSING. ECON. 482, 487 (2001) (noting that smaller properties “are
also less likely to receive direct government assistance, including Section 8, the Low
Income Housing Tax Credit, government grants and/or property tax relief” and that
“[o]nly thirty-four percent of small properties reported that they receive some type of
government assistance, compared to fifty-six percent of large developments”).
32. Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 3; see also Stegman, supra note 7, at
419 (“While national policy is committed to the goal of providing every American fam
ily with a decent home, one extremely scarce housing resource, the low-rent sector of
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SMALL MULTIFAMILY MORTGAGE
FINANCE

OF

Loan underwriting had historically been a very local activity,
one that was based on a careful evaluation of an individual’s finan
cial prospects, reliability, and place within the community. Local
thrifts, in particular, were very active in small multifamily lending,
until the savings-and-loan crisis and the real-estate downturn of the
1980s reduced their activity in this area.33 Since the 1980s, however,
there has been a great change in multifamily property finance as the
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) industry took off.
This movement from local to global mortgage funding had a
profound impact on the financing options available for small multi
family properties.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, entrepreneurs, par
ticularly those who were different in some way (real or perceived)
from their local bankers, faced great difficulty in obtaining financ
ing from their local banks.34 This difficulty was intensified in innercity areas.35 In the absence of financing from established lenders,
more sympathetic savings and loans arose in established immigrant
communities.36 Borrowers also turned to informal lenders who
would lend within a particular ethnic group.37 These so-called “im
migrant lenders” gave “many simple shopkeepers and small-scale
entrepreneurs ready access to large pools of capital and . . . they
the privately owned housing inventory, is being squandered.”). Apgar and
Narasimhan’s point applies just as much to housing preservation efforts to the extent
that they too focus on large projects.
33. See Denise DiPasquale & Jean L. Cummings, Financing Multifamily Rental
Housing: The Changing Role of Lenders and Investors, 3 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 77,
78 (1992); James R. Follain & Edward J. Szymanoski, A Framework for Evaluating
Government’s Evolving Role in Multifamily Mortgage Markets, 1 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y
DEV. & RES. 151, 151-52 (1995); see also Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 7
(“Indeed, by 2001, S&Ls provided just 17.2 percent of financing to properties with 5 to
49 units, compared to 36.9 percent in 1991.”).
34. Jared N. Day, Credit, Capital and Community: Informal Banking in Immigrant
Communities in the United States, 1880–1924, 9 FIN. HIST. REV. 65, 65 (2002) (noting
that immigrants were not usually welcomed at traditional banks); see also SAM B.
WARNER, JR., STREETCAR SUBURBS: THE PROCESS OF GROWTH IN BOSTON, 1870-1900,
at 117-24 (1961) (describing typically complex financing of residential projects in late
nineteenth century).
35. See STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 196.
36. DAVID L. MASON, FROM BUILDINGS AND LOANS TO BAIL-OUTS: A HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY, 1831-1995, at 54-56 (2004).
37. Day, supra note 34, at 65. Indeed, Henry, Emmanuel, and Mayer Lehman
began in the informal immigrant banking world before founding Lehman Brothers, as
did A.P. Giannini, the founder of Bank of America. Id. at 77.
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overwhelmingly invested these funds in local real estate either as
unlicensed lenders or as direct builders and purchasers.”38 Because
of the lack of access to traditional lenders, immigrant lenders be
came “critical sources of capital for local real estate investment.”39
Starting around World War I, the role of the immigrant lender
in multifamily investment began to be displaced by competition
from insurance and title companies, as well as other lenders.40 And
over the course of the Great Depression, with its concomitant wave
of foreclosures, many landlords lost their buildings.41 These trends
initiated the professionalization of the multifamily real-estate in
dustry, as many individual owners were shaken out, one way or an
other.42 This trend continued in the Post-War period, accompanied
by more and more government involvement in multifamily
finance.43
Another significant ownership trend developed in the 1960s,
whereby many African Americans purchased central-city, multi
family properties and used the housing for residential as well as in
come purposes.44 This trend was accompanied by the widespread
abandonment of central-city housing by many absentee owners in
the 1960s and 1970s as buildings stopped producing sufficient in
38. JARED N. DAY, URBAN CASTLES 40 (Kenneth T. Jackson ed., 1999). One
1920 federal report observed that “real estate, first and second mortgages, and specula
tive securities were favored forms of investment. Such holdings are almost uniformly
the heaviest assets of the [immigrant] banker.” Id. at 40-41; see LOUIS WINNICK,
RENTAL HOUSING: OPPORTUNITIES FOR PRIVATE INVESTMENT 159 (1958).
Frequently the small investor of past decades was a modest businessman or
even a worker, often of foreign heritage, who regarded the purchase of a new
residential property from his lifetime savings as providing not only a place to
live, but also added personal status, a retirement income, and, with luck and
rising prices, an estate for his children.
Id.; STEGMAN, supra note 8, at 41 (“Many of the smaller landlords are first-generation
Americans . . . .”).
39. DAY, supra note 38, at 41 (“[E]vidence suggests that the overall volume of
[immigrant lenders’] economic activity may have been staggering.”).
40. Id. (noting that regulation drove out some immigrant lenders); see Donald S.
Bradley et al., Financing Multifamily Properties: A Play with New Actors and New
Lines, 4 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 5, 11 (1998) (discussing the developing role
of insurers and other new players in the multifamily mortgage market).
41. DAY, supra note 38, at 176-177.
42. Id. Louis Winnick noted that one estimate in the 1950s found that “the pro
portion of apartment mortgage debt held by institutional lenders rose from about 50
[percent] at the end of the twenties to 80 [percent] in the mid-fifties.” WINNICK, supra
note 38, at 160.
43. See MORTON, supra note 10, at 48-70 (providing detailed history of growth
and structure of lending industry through early 1950s); WINNICK, supra note 38, at 155.
44. STERNLIEB & BURCHELL, supra note 7, at 97.
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come even to cover the basic costs of taxes and utilities, let alone
insurance, financing, and maintenance expenses.45 As many cities
became unstable in the 1960s, private lenders became scarce in the
multifamily market.46 Even after cities recovered from the aban
donment crisis, the multifamily market continued with a cycle of
booms and busts—most notably the late-1980s to early-1990s bust
and the late-1990s and early-2000s boom—followed by the bust in
which we now find ourselves.47
Historically, the available private-sector lending was unattrac
tive from the multi-unit landlord’s perspective.48 Throughout much
of the twentieth century, private multifamily mortgages had been
short term, requiring a borrower to refinance frequently and face
the risk that the interest-rate environment might become unfavora
ble.49 Such an unstable lending environment can lead to a de
pressed real-estate market as owners lose faith in their ability to sell
45. See, e.g., STERNLIEB & BURCHELL, supra note 7, at 269-352 (studying aban
donment in Newark); THE NEW YORK CITY RAND INSTITUTE, RENTAL HOUSING IN
NEW YORK CITY 9-11 (Ira S. Lowry ed., 1970) [hereinafter RENTAL HOUSING IN NEW
YORK CITY]; David J. Reiss, Housing Abandonment and New York City’s Response, 22
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 783 (1996). The abandonment crisis was most severe
in the East, as broad demographic changes drove jobs and people to other parts of the
country. See Harold L. Bunce & Sue G. Neal, Trends in City Conditions During the
1970s: A Survey of Demographic and Socioeconomic Changes, 14 PUBLIUS 7, 8-10
(1984).
46. See, e.g., STEGMAN, supra note 8, at 197 (“In Baltimore, too, the absence of
mortgage capital is a critical factor in the declining inner-city market . . . .”); STERNLIEB
& BURCHELL, supra note 7, at xxv (“Primary lenders in urban areas—commercial and
mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations, insurance companies, and even
individuals—are getting out of the inner city mortgage lending business. They are re
placed by mortgage companies which deal almost exclusively in insured loans.”); see
also RENTAL HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 45, at 9 (“[I]nstitutional investors are, as rapidly as possible, reducing their portfolios of controlled housing and of
housing in deteriorated neighborhoods.”).
47. Lawrence Goldberg & Charles A. Capone, Jr., Multifamily Mortgage Credit
Risk: Lessons from Recent History, 4 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 93, 95 (1998)
(discussing tax and accounting aspects of booms and busts of 1980s-2000s); Segal, supra
note 23, at 178 (discussing the 1980s and 1990s bust); Prabha Natarajan, Real-Estate
Finance: Apartments Try to Stay Afloat, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2009, at C11 (reporting on
rising mortgage defaults for multifamily properties).
48. See STERNLIEB & BURCHELL, supra note 7, at 237. The authors note,
The availability of institutional financing is one of the major determinants of
the health and vitality of the real estate market. If the banks, savings and loan
companies, insurance companies, and the like are willing to lend in an area,
then owners can have confidence that their investments in properties are re
deemable through ultimate resale or remortgaging.
Id.
49. GEORGE STERNLIEB & JAMES W. HUGHES, THE FUTURE OF RENTAL HOUS
ING 89 (1981).
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their property because potential buyers are unable to arrange for
financing.50
Owners of smaller multifamily properties seem to find their fi
nancing options even less attractive, as seen from the fact that such
buildings are mortgaged less often than larger multifamily proper
ties.51 Mortgages secured by smaller properties also tend to have
higher interest rates,52 and they have adjustable interest rates more
frequently than mortgages secured by larger properties; this ex
poses them to interest-rate risk.53
One major reason for the different mortgage terms for small
and large properties is that the underwriting of any commercial
mortgage is associated with significant fixed costs.54 These under
writing costs, payable to third-party providers, can exceed $10,000
50. Id. at 87-89.
51. Segal, supra note 23, at 179-80 (noting that owners of smaller buildings are
more likely to rely on relational financing from depository institutions). The lower rate
of mortgages for smaller buildings may also be explained in part by the fact that smaller
buildings are easier to buy in an all-cash transaction and that smaller mortgages can be
paid in full more easily. Finally, it is unclear what the socially optimal rate of financing
for multifamily buildings is, so it may or may not be that the lower proportion of mort
gages for smaller buildings is actually undesirable. That being said, many of the com
mentators discussed herein take the position that the small multifamily sector has a
more difficult time obtaining financing than other sectors of the mortgage market.
52. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 13. Small multifamily properties also tend to pay
significantly higher mortgage rates. Bradley, supra note 31, at 502 (estimating that rates
on small properties are about 100 basis points higher than rates on large developments);
see also Drew Schneider & James Follain, A New Initiative in the Federal Housing Ad
ministration’s Office of Multifamily Housing Programs: An Assessment of Small Projects
Processing, 4 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 43, 49 (1998) (noting that, in some
cases, smaller multifamily mortgages are as much as 300 basis points higher).
53. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 13-14. Interest-rate risk is the risk that the payments a company owes on short-term debt that funds purchases become mismatched
with the interest payments it receives in turn from its long-term investments. David
Reiss, The Federal Government’s Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac’s
Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1031 (2008).
54. Schneider & Follain, supra note 52, at 49-50; see also HERBERT, supra note
20, at iv (arguing that higher interest rates reflect the need to amortize fixed costs over
the life of the loan, the reduced competition in the market segment, and the lack of
sophistication of the borrowers in that segment). Commercial mortgage underwriting
primarily focuses on the ability of the property to cover its monthly expenses and its
monthly mortgage expenses in particular. By way of contrast, residential mortgage un
derwriting focuses on whether the borrower has the capacity to repay the loan.
A recent study of community bank underwriting suggests that the use of consumer
credit scores for owners of small businesses—as opposed to reliance on best estimates
of the creditworthiness of the small business itself—may prove a way to expand credit
without increasing credit risk. See Allen N. Berger et al., The Surprising Use of Credit
Scoring in Small Business Lending by Community Banks and the Attendant Effects on
Credit Availability and Risk 1-4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper 2009-9,
2009), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/wp0909.pdf.
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and typically include charges for appraisals, environmental reviews,
and attorney certifications.55 Because the small-apartment-building
lender has to recoup those costs from a smaller principal base, there
will be higher upfront fees or a higher interest rate, which will allow
the lender to amortize those fixed costs over time.56
As a result of the unattractive terms available in the private,
multifamily mortgage market generally, the government sector has
sought to expand financing options.57 Various government pro
grams stepped in to provide more stable lending to such borrowers,
including the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), as well as
state- and government-sponsored enterprise programs.58 Because
of the high fixed costs associated with originating and servicing such
loans, however, these government programs faced similar con
straints as private lenders. As a result, these multifamily mortgage
programs also have historically poorly served the smaller multi
family subsector.
A variety of FHA programs provided mortgages, either di
rectly or indirectly, for multifamily properties.59 The market pene
tration of these programs has waxed and waned with changes in the
market and the political environment.60 FHA programs, however,
have been frequently criticized for their high interest rates, slow
approval processes, overly strict underwriting criteria, and rela
tively short (five-year) terms.61 Over time, the FHA has also
55. See HERBERT, supra note 20, at 15-16.
56. See Bradley et al., supra note 40, at 15 (noting that the fixed costs of loan
review “increase as a percentage of loan balance as loan size decreases”).
57. See STERNLIEB & HUGHES, supra note 49, at 91 (noting that the government
sector had become a dominant lender in the multifamily sector even though it imposes
some terms that landlords find onerous).
58. See id. at 89-91.
59. The FHA provides for mortgages indirectly by offering mortgage insurance to
lenders that insures against losses incurred when borrowers default. ALEX F.
SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 49-50 (2006) (discussing various
FHA programs); EDWARD J. SZYMANOSKI & SUSAN J. DONAHUE, DO FHA MULTI
FAMILY MORTGAGE INSURANCE PROGRAMS PROVIDE AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND
SERVE UNDERSERVED AREAS? 6 (1999); U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Descrip
tions of Multifamily Programs, http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/mfh/progdesc/
progdesc.cfm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (listing FHA mortgage insurance origination
programs).
60. Vandell, supra note 10, at 323 (noting that “[b]y 1993, FHA was virtually out
of the multifamily business, making up only 6 percent of multifamily starts”).
61. See, e.g., STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 186-87, 192-96; WINNICK, supra note 38,
at 171; Follain & Szymanoski, supra note 33, at 152-53 (discussing the “litany of
problems” with the FHA). The FHA responds to these criticisms on its website. FHA
Website, Dispelling Common Myths About Participating with FHA (on file with au
thor). For a history of the early FHA, seen from a planning perspective, see MARK A.
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tended to provide financing for larger buildings as well, in part be
cause of the efficiencies presented by larger projects.62 This was
compounded by the fact that owners of smaller properties were
often less likely to know about and access such government pro
grams because of lack of knowledge about, experience with, and
expertise with them.63
Many states have housing finance agencies that provide lowinterest loans and long terms in exchange for caps on rents.64 How
ever, these programs also tend to favor larger projects, because,
again, of the fixed costs associated with them.65 Other stategovernment programs directed at property owners are also less
often accessed by owners of smaller multifamily properties.66
The federal government has not taken a strong lead in support
ing small multifamily finance as compared to other mortgage sub
sectors.67 The Federal National Mortgage Association (commonly
known as “Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (commonly known as “Freddie Mac”), the two govern
ment-sponsored enterprises that dominate the conforming residen
tial (owner-occupied) mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) market,
first entered the multifamily market in a significant way in the
WEISS, THE RISE OF THE COMMUNITY BUILDERS: THE AMERICAN REAL ESTATE IN
DUSTRY AND URBAN LAND PLANNING 141-158 (1987).
62. See STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 189 (noting that fixed costs could be spread
over more units in larger buildings); Segal, supra note 23, at 189 (noting that the proportion of small-multifamily mortgages insured by the FHA fell from 39.4% in 1989 to
1.9% in 2002). In 1997, the FHA announced its Small Projects Processing Program,
which was intended to reach the small-project market that had been marginalized in
earlier FHA programs. Id.; see also Schneider & Follain, supra note 52, at 48 (finding
that the FHA’s standard multifamily programs “are prohibitive for financing small
projects”). Vandell does note, however, that the FHA has focused on smaller projects
at various times in its history. Vandell, supra note 10, at 324 (noting that FHA’s postwar focus was on smaller projects).
63. See STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 189.
64. See National Council of State Housing Agencies, HFA Directory, http://
www.ncsha.org/housing-help (last visited Apr. 27, 2010).
65. Schnare, supra note 22, at 21-22 (citing Bradley, supra note 31); see also JUSTIN COOPER, MULTIFAMILY RENTAL HOUSING: FINANCING WITH TAX-EXEMPT BONDS
21 (2003) (noting that because the costs of offering tax-exempt bonds “to the public are
largely fixed, but project sizes and costs vary widely, some transactions are too small to
justify the cost of a public offering”).
66. Bradley, supra note 31, at 487.
67. See MEETING MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS, supra note 2, at iv.
For a list of federal multifamily finance programs, see SCHMITZ ET AL., supra note 19, at
160. In a 1992 study prepared for HUD, researchers found that ten percent of all units
in HUD-insured multifamily housing properties were in buildings with fewer than fifty
units. JAMES E. WALLACE ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF THE HUD-INSURED MULTIFAMILY
HOUSING STOCK 2-4 (1992).
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1990s.68 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have, however, had limited
exposure to the small multifamily sector, tending to put their re
sources in the large multifamily sector.69 This is partly because
their underwriting and servicing standards often are uneconomical
or too stringent for smaller buildings and their owners.70
Starting in the early 1990s, a vibrant, private, secondary mort
gage market for multifamily housing mortgages also developed.71
At that time, the Wall Street firms developed so-called “private
label” CMBS which included multifamily mortgages.72 At the peak
of the global CMBS market in 2007, there was nearly $309 billion in
CMBS issued, of which almost $49 billion, or sixteen percent, was
comprised of multifamily mortgages.73
68. See generally DiPasquale & Cummings, supra note 33.
69. MEETING MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS, supra note 2, at 4; see
also Frank E. Nothaft & James L. Freund, The Evolution of Securitization in Multifam
ily Mortgage Markets and Its Effect on Lending Rates, 25 J. REAL EST. RES. 91, 91-92
(2003) (describing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s limited exposure to multifamily sec
tors, which “reflected the nature of the underlying multifamily loans: mortgage con
tracts were not standardized, the collateral rental properties were heterogeneous and
the geographic concentration of properties made multifamily lending a more risky un
dertaking”). As the Joint Center notes, Fannie and Freddie typically “only increased
their focus on financing smaller (5-49 unit) multifamily rental properties temporarily
when” doing so helped them meet the affordable housing goals set for them by Con
gress. MEETING MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS, supra note 2, at 7; see
KIMBERLY BURNETT & LINDA B. FOSBURG, STUDY OF THE MULTIFAMILY UNDER
WRITING AND THE GSES’ ROLE IN THE MULTIFAMILY MARKET: EXPANDED VERSION,
at x-xi (2001) (noting that the “GSEs’ multifamily purchases do not appear to be con
tributing consistently to the mitigation of excessive cost of mortgage financing facing
small properties with five to 50 units,” but also noting that HUD had implemented an
incentive for the GSEs to become more active in this segment); see also HUD’s Regula
tion of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), 65 Fed. Reg. 65,044, 65,045 (Oct. 31, 2000)
(codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 81 (2009)) (noting that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac “have
been much less active in purchasing mortgages in markets where there is a need for
additional financing to address persistent housing needs including financing for small
multifamily rental properties, manufactured housing, single family owner-occupied
rental properties, seasoned affordable housing mortgages, and older housing in need of
rehabilitation”).
70. Schneider & Follain, supra note 52, at 49.
71. See AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL
POLICY, supra note 3, at 14; DiPasquale & Cummings, supra note 33.
72. Kent W. Colton & Kate Collignon, Multifamily Rental Housing in the 21st
Century 64 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. W01-1,
2001), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/colton_w01-1.pdf.
73. COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE ALERT, GLOBAL CMBS ISSUANCE IN 2008 (2008),
available at http://www.cmalert.com/ranking.php?rid=198. Global Multifamily CMBS
issuance grew from $9.9 billion in 2000. COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE ALERT, GLOBAL
CMBS ISSUANCE IN 2001 (2001), available at http://www.cmalert.com/ranking.php?rid
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Securitization works best when the underlying assets are simi
lar because such similarity reduces due diligence and other costs.74
One of the main limitations of the multifamily CMBS market is that
the underlying mortgages are not uniform, particularly in the case
of smaller properties.75 This increases the transaction costs for all
parties who must deal with them.76 Furthermore, owners of small
properties often do not keep the kind of records that investors
would require in order to invest in such properties, even at the
mortgage-backed pool level.77
The proportion of multifamily mortgages that had been securi
tized since the early 1990s has grown steadily as Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac and the private-label sector has gained more experi
ence with the CMBS market.78 In 1986, less than ten percent of
multifamily mortgages were either held or securitized through the
activities of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) like Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, federal agencies like Ginnie Mae, and pri
vate securities issuers.79 Just ten years later, in 1996, this number
had jumped to twenty-three percent.80 And in 2006, prior to the
=170. It has since fallen to $2.9 billion in 2008 as a result of the credit crisis. See
GLOBAL CMBS ISSUANCE IN 2008, supra.
74. See Peter M. Carrozzo, Marketing the American Mortgage: The Emergency
Home Finance Act of 1970, Standardization and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 765, 778 (2005) (“Without a standardized mortgage docu
ment and uniform lending techniques, the secondary market never would have gotten
off the ground.”).
75. THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23; DiPasquale & Cummings, supra note 33, at 97.
76. DiPasquale & Cummings, supra note 33, at 97.
77. Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 2.
78. AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POL
ICY, supra note 3, at 14 (“Along with increased standardization of underwriting criteria
and loan documentation, these trends created a larger, more stable, and less expensive
source of capital for rental property owners and developers, while also providing
greater diversification for investors.”).
79. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS AC
COUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS 1985-1994, at 87
tbl.L.219 [hereinafter FLOW OF FUNDS 1985-1994], available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/annuals/a1985-1994.pdf. The calculations
in this paragraph take into account the sum of outstanding multifamily residential mort
gage debt attributed to “Government-sponsored enterprises,” “Agency- and GSEbacked mortgage pools,” and “ABS issuers,” as compared to the “Total Liabilities” of
multifamily residential mortgage debt.
80. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS AC
COUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS 1995-2004, at 87
tbl.L.219, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/annuals/a1995
2004.pdf.
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credit crisis, roughly forty-five percent of multifamily mortgages
were sold into the secondary mortgage market.81
However, the increase in securitization was concentrated in
mortgages secured by large properties.82 Small multifamily mort
gages made up significantly less than ten percent of total securitized
multifamily volume in the late 1990s and early 2000s.83 Smaller
loans and loans for properties with five to forty-nine units mostly
bypass the secondary market altogether and remain in the domain
of bank and thrift portfolio lenders.84
81.

See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS AC
UNITED STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS 2005-2008, at 87
tbls.L.218 & L.219 [hereinafter FLOW OF FUNDS 2005-2008], available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/annuals/a2005-2008.pdf. By way of con
trast, sixty percent of mortgages on one- to four-family properties were sold into the
secondary mortgage market in 2006. Id. This increase in securitization was, of course,
at the expense of traditional players in the commercial mortgage market: the portion of
multifamily mortgages held by commercial banks, savings institutions, and life insur
ance companies dropped from sixty-two percent in 1986, FLOW OF FUNDS 1985-1994,
supra note 79, at 87 tbl.L219, to forty percent in 2006, FLOW OF FUNDS 2005-2008,
supra, at 87 tbl.L.219.
82. AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POL
ICY, supra note 3, at 14. The report notes,
[A] dual mortgage delivery system began to emerge. Individuals and investors
seeking to purchase, rehabilitate, or build smaller rental properties were in
creasingly served by a distinctly different set of mortgage products, provided
by a distinctly different set of lenders, than those financing larger rental
properties. The Survey of Residential Finance documents [show] that by 2001,
some 86 percent of all apartment properties with 50 or more units had a mort
gage, and as many as 65 percent of these properties had a level-payment,
fixed-rate loan. In contrast, only 58 percent of five- to nine-unit apartment
buildings had a mortgage, and just a third had level-payment, fixed-rate
mortgages.
Id.
83. Segal, supra note 23, at 191. Christopher Herbert, writing in 2001, noted that
only 1.8% of loans in CMBS consisted of small loans. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 14.
Herbert’s research suggests that the CMBS market does not offer lower interest rates;
rather, it offers fixed-rate financing where depositories typically offer adjustable-rate
financing. Id. at vi. Even though Fannie and Freddie’s exposure to this submarket is
small, it is larger than that of private label CMBS players. Id. at vii. Other actors play a
significant role in financing multifamily housing: for instance, pension funds and life
insurance companies typically finance luxury multifamily developments. MEETING
MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS, supra note 2, at 4. Mortgage Real Estate
Investment Trusts also invest in multifamily projects. SCHMITZ, MULTIFAMILY HOUS
ING DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 156; see Vandell, supra note 10, at
345 (discussing limited role of mortgage REITs in multifamily finance). I have not been
able to find more up-to-date data for small multifamily securitization rates.
84. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NA
TION’S HOUSING 24 (2004) [hereinafter THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2004)],
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2004.pdf (noting that
in 1999, “more than half of all multifamily loans financed by banks and thrifts had
COUNTS OF THE
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In sum, the small multifamily subsector remains comparatively
underserved in the secondary mortgage market as well as in the
primary mortgage market.85 As a result, there is evidence that a
“credit gap” has existed in parts of the multifamily mortgage mar
ket, particularly in the five- to forty-nine-unit property sector.86
The question remains: should the government intervene to shrink
that gap?
III. THE CASE FOR SUBSIDIZING LANDLORDS
PROPERTIES HAS NOT BEEN MADE

OF

SMALL

As leading housing scholar Stegman notes, ‘“it is obvious that
the substantial owner of slum real estate is not in business for altru
istic purposes’ . . . but since when is altruism a prerequisite for pro
gress?”87 Stegman and Sternlieb argue that it may benefit society
to help wealth-maximizing small-apartment-building owners in or
der to ultimately assist low- and moderate-income tenants.88
While I do not disagree with this general proposition, I believe
that we should be certain that any aid given to landlords will actu
ally be passed on in large part to their tenants, whether through
lower rents or improved conditions. As such, I question the extent
to which the government should implement affordable housing ini
tiatives by subsidizing small-apartment-building owners. This ques
tion is of pressing importance because leading housing scholars
balances of $1 million or less, compared with about 15 percent of the multifamily loans
financed by” Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). HUD’s 1996 Property Owners and Man
agers Survey reveals that depositories fund about seventy percent of mortgages for
buildings with fewer than fifty units versus forty-five percent of properties with one
hundred or more units. Herbert, supra note 20, at 13; see also THE STATE OF THE
NATION’S HOUSING (2004), supra, at 24 (noting that because of the history of the secon
dary mortgage market, two- to four-unit properties are more readily securitized because
they are grouped with single-family homes in the residential mortgage market and are
securitized as part of residential, mortgage-backed securities). Although underwriting
costs for small properties are proportionately higher, it appears that such properties are
“comparable to larger multifamily properties in historical loan performance.” Schnei
der & Follain, supra note 52, at 49.
85. See HUD’s Regulation of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), 65 Fed. Reg.
65,044, 65,050 (Oct. 31, 2000) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 81) (“There is evidence that the
aging stocks of single family rental properties and small multifamily properties with 5
50 units, which play a key role in lower-income housing, have experienced difficulties in
obtaining financing.”).
86. William Segal & Edward J. Szymanoski, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the
Multifamily Mortgage Market, 4 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 59, 65 (1998).
87. Stegman, supra note 7, at 423 (quoting STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 139).
88. See generally STERNLIEB, supra note 1; Stegman, supra note 7.
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believe that small multifamily mortgages should in fact be
subsidized.
Leading housing scholars have advocated for small multifamily
mortgage subsidies for over forty years. Michael Stegman has
called for decreased costs for small-property owners, even while ac
knowledging that there “is something distasteful about trying to
rally support for a group of property owners who have been consid
ered the natural enemy of liberal housing reformers ever since the
industrial revolution.”89 More recently, the Joint Center, along
with affiliated researchers, has called for Congress to expend public
funds to develop new financing tools, including subsidies, for small,
privately-owned apartment buildings.90
The Joint Center’s William Apgar and Shekar Narasimhan
have presented perhaps the most well-developed subsidy proposal
to date.91 They advocate that the federal government sponsor a
“small Real Estate Investment Trust (S-REIT) that would aggre
gate ownership of older, smaller multifamily properties with low or
89.
90.

Stegman, supra note 7, at 420.
See, e.g., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NA
TIONAL POLICY, supra note 3, at 20. For example,
Since developing new affordable rental housing remains difficult without steep
subsidy, preserving whatever low-cost units remain should be an urgent prior
ity. The success of preservation efforts depends in large measure on the will
ingness of Congress to appropriate sufficient funds to renew expiring projectbased contracts and fund additional efforts to slow the loss of privately owned
low-cost rentals.
Id.; see William Apgar, Rethinking Rental Housing: Expanding the Ability of Rental
Housing to Serve as a Pathway to Economic and Social Opportunity 55 (Joint Ctr. for
Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. W04-11, 2004), available at http://
www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/w04-11.pdf (fleshing out a proposal for a
trust that “could combine private capital with federal, state and local resources, while at
the same time reducing costs associated with obtaining subsidies on a project-by-project
basis”); Revisiting Rental Housing Policy, supra note 17, at 16 (“Some owners who are
interested in continuing to operate their properties as low-cost housing will need help
with capital needs; other properties may need to be purchased to preserve affordability.
While much is known about ways to preserve subsidized developments, preservation
strategies for the unassisted stock have received little attention”); Stegman, supra note
7, at 420. Shaun Donovan, now the Secretary of HUD, has proposed subsidizing the
cost of underwriting, servicing, and securitization for small multifamily buildings.
Shaun Donovan, Background Paper on Market Rate Multifamily Rental Housing 21
(Millennial Hous. Comm’n, Fin. Task Force, 2002), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/mhc/
papers/mrmf.doc. This proposal rests, it appears, on the assumption that such a subsidy
would be a relatively efficient way to increase the supply of affordable housing. See
Stegman, supra note 7, at 420.
91. Despite the repeated refrain for new financing alternatives and subsidies by
affordable-housing advocates like the Joint Center, there is surprisingly little in con
crete proposals as to how to implement policies directing subsidies to small-building
owners.
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modest rents” and act as a conduit for federal subsidies.92 From
this investment vehicle, small-multifamily-property owners would
receive the following benefits: they would incur no capital gains tax
on exchanging their property for a proportionate (and liquid) inter
est in the S-REIT; they would gain access to credit at a lower price
by means of the S-REIT’s tax-exempt bond issuing capability; and
properties managed by the trust would be exempt from recording
taxes and would be eligible for local tax abatements.93 Individually,
each of these benefits would confer a significant advantage over
owners of comparable properties; taken collectively, these benefits
represent a substantial subsidy channeled directly to owners of
small multifamily buildings who choose to participate in an S-REIT.
There are two main rationales for subsidizing small-building
landlords. First, they provide housing to the neediest tenants: lowand moderate-income families who are not fortunate enough to
have obtained subsidized apartments. Second, the multifamily
mortgage market is subject to market failures that make govern
ment intervention appropriate. I will assess these two rationales in
turn.
A. The Affordability Rationale
Housing economist John Quigley writes,
“Affordability” is clearly the most compelling rationale for
polices [sic] subsidizing rental housing. The high cost of rental
housing, relative to the ability of low-income households to pay
for housing, means that these households have few resources left
over for expenditures on other goods—food, clothing,
medicine—which are also necessities.94
92. Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 2. The Community Preservation Corporation (CPC) also proposed a model of MBS that was intended to address the needs
of smaller (six to twelve) unit buildings. Follain & Szymanoski, supra note 33, at 168-72
(evaluating the CPC proposal).
93. Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 19-20.
94. John M. Quigley, Just Suppose: Housing Subsidies for Low-Income Renters
13 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Paper No. RR07-9, 2007), available at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/revisiting_rental_symposium/papers/
rr07-9_quigley.pdf, and reprinted in REVISITING RENTAL HOUSING: POLICIES, PRO
GRAMS, AND PRIORITIES 300 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2008); see Rob
ert C. Ellickson, The Mediocrity of Government Subsidies to Mixed-Income Housing
Projects 3 (Yale Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public
Policy, Paper No. 360, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1217870 (“Most hous
ing experts agree that the chief challenge today is not how to improve the quality of
American dwellings, but how to make what’s available more affordable to households
on a tight budget.”); Schnare, supra note 22, at 27 (“Given the relatively low incomes of
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Quigley’s position applies to all affordable housing subsidies.
To make the case that it applies with special force to subsidies di
rected at for-profit owners of small apartment buildings, one must
argue that such actors are better at delivering affordable housing to
at least some category of households than other actors.
And, indeed, that argument does have some merit. For in
stance, if other providers of affordable housing systematically ex
clude some low-income households, a case may be made that
for-profit owners of small apartment buildings do play a socially
beneficial role as landlords of last resort. There is evidence that
some affordable housing providers have a history of behaving in
just this way. Public housing authorities have at various times in
their history effectively screened “out any prospective tenant family
who for any reason might act irresponsibly or fail to adequately
care for its government-owned housing unit.”95 Michael Stegman
therefore argues that it “rests with the private landlord to provide
such families with housing.”96 While Stegman wrote this over forty
this nation’s renters—and the relatively high costs of operating and maintaining units—
there is a real and unmet need for rental subsidies.”); see also Roger Starr, Private
Ventures in Slum Building Rehabilitation for Low-Income Families, 24 J. HOUSING 32
(1967). Starr notes that
it is clear that rehabilitation of old law tenements for low income families can
not be done profitably without heavy subsidization—above and beyond low
interest, long term mortgages, and tax abatements. What seems to be needed
are either rent supplements, which would permit realistic rent levels, or an
initial capital grant which would help keep rents at a level that tenants could
afford out of their own earnings.
Id., quoted in Stegman, supra note 7, at 423; WINNICK, supra note 38, at 171 (“The
problems and perplexities of rental housing demonstrate that some form of government
assistance has been—and still is—an inescapable requirement for an adequate volume
of new private investment in rental housing . . . .”).
95. Stegman, supra note 7, at 420; SCHWARTZ, supra note 59, at 105 (noting that
during the early days of public housing, “[m]anagers conducted home visits to most
applicants to see whether their households were sufficiently orderly to qualify for public
housing,” and that “[m]anagers were also not shy about evicting unruly tenants or
tenants who failed to keep their homes up to an acceptable standard of tidiness”);
Michael H. Schill & Susan W. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and
Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1298 (1995)
(“In the early years of the [public housing] program, [Public Housing Authorities] had
enormous latitude in admission and eviction decisions. This freedom permitted [the
housing authorities] to screen out ‘problem’ tenants and quickly evict those who cre
ated difficulties.”); see also NICHOLAS DAGEN BLOOM, PUBLIC HOUSING THAT
WORKED: NEW YORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 7 (2009) (noting that the level of
scrutiny applied to public-housing applicants waxed and waned over time and among
jurisdictions).
96. Stegman, supra note 7, at 420.
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years ago, his argument can hold true for federally assisted housing
providers today.97
This state of affairs is further exacerbated by the long-term dis
investment in the nation’s stock of subsidized affordable housing.
Since the 1980s,
the pace of government spending in general has slowed; the
problems in large-scale public housing projects are proving in
tractable; the new subsidized alternative—small-scale, scatteredsite, mixed-income projects—provides housing for very few fami
lies at an exorbitant cost. It has become apparent to most that the
government simply cannot replace the private sector in the hous
ing market. The regulatory environment needs to reflect this
new policy awareness and encourage, or at least not discourage,
private rental housing ownership.98
97. “Federally assisted housing” includes public-housing projects, Section-8
tenant-based rent vouchers, as well as housing financed, insured, constructed, and sub
stantially rehabilitated via federal funding. 42 U.S.C. § 13641(2) (2006). By statute,
providers of federally assisted housing are required to screen prospective tenants and
may reject households where any member is using illegal drugs, abusing alcohol, or is
engaging in any “criminal activity which would adversely affect the health, safety, or
right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents.” 42 U.S.C. § 13661; see
also 24 C.F.R. § 960.203 (2009). Similarly, federal law provides for the termination of
assistance where a household member is found to be using drugs or abusing alcohol. 42
U.S.C. § 13662. In both screening and termination decisions, what constitutes a disqual
ifying violation is left to the discretion of the housing provider. Id. This blanket au
thority has prompted one public-interest lawyer to warn that the greatest concern for
advocates representing poor clients is “overzealous officials” barring families with even
minor criminal histories, despite the absence of a conviction or even an arrest. John J.
Ammann, Housing out the Poor, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 309, 318 (2000). Fur
ther, the aggressive implementation of such “One Strike” policies to disqualify federal
housing applicants has been incentivized by HUD. Funding bonuses and freedom from
federal oversight is linked, in part, to the number of applicants a housing authority has
rejected in accordance with the “One Strike” initiative. See 24 C.F.R. § 902.71 (laying
out incentives for housing authorities); OFFICE OF PUB. & INDIAN HOUS., U.S. DEP’T
OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., “ONE STRIKE AND YOU’RE OUT” POLICY IN PUBLIC HOUSING
(attachment to Notice No. 96-16, Apr. 12, 1996), available at http://www.hud.gov/
offices/adm/hudclips/notices/pih/files/96-16PIHN.doc (exhorting housing authorities to
aggressively implement “One Strike” criteria in return for performance incentives).
Compounding the difficulties faced by tenants of federally assisted housing, ex
isting law also empowers housing providers to disqualify entire households for the acts
of a single member, even where the family is ignorant of the offending conduct. 42
U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6); see HUD v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 (2002) (affirming a publichousing operator’s broad authority to conduct such “no-fault” evictions under the
statute).
98. Schloming & Schloming, supra note 12, at 30; see RICHARD HILTON &
CHARLES HANSON, EVALUATION OF THE MARK-TO-MARKET PROGRAM 1 (2004) (not
ing that from the mid-1960s through the mid-1980s “the Federal Government commit
ted substantial resources for project-based rental assistance in new or substantially
rehabilitated multifamily (5 units or more) properties for low- or moderate-income
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A final important factor contributing to the problem of af
fordability is that a significant amount of rental housing is being
demolished or permanently taken out of service; this is particularly
true in distressed communities where the need for affordable hous
ing is often the greatest, but rings true in gentrifying communities as
well.99
With possible “skimming” of the best tenants by government
and not-for-profit housing providers, the long-term reduction in
government-supported housing, and the material reduction in the
stock of affordable housing, low- and moderate-income families
who did not get a subsidized apartment have to fend for themselves
in the private housing market. As a result of these long-term
trends, the Joint Center has sought to redirect some of the focus of
the housing preservation debate from subsidized housing to “the
families,” and that “[t]hese properties were subsidized through a variety of different
programs, but they were all provided with long-term subsidies for specific rental units
owned by private landlords”); SCHWARTZ, supra note 59, at 34-37 (charting decrease in
federal assistance for affordable housing). It should be noted that the Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit has financed more than two million units of affordable housing
since 1987. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDITS: AFFORDABLE HOUSING INVESTMENT OPPORTU
NITIES FOR BANKS 1 (2008), available at www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008-10a.pdf.
While this is a great achievement, it does not come close to meeting the need for afford
able housing. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 59, at 18-37 (summarizing serious af
fordability and housing condition issues in rental-housing stock). And despite its many
successes, the recent economic downturn has destabilized the market for Low-Income
Housing Tax credits. Ruth Simon et al., Millions for Foreclosures, WALL ST. J., June 18,
2008, at C12 (“Demand for tax credits has waned among banks and financial giants
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac because they haven’t been registering profits.”). One
could argue that a benefit of the Joint Center’s proposal is that, unlike Low-Income
Housing Tax credits that cannot function well in a contracting economy, the S-REIT
would continue to operate. However, outside of a dire recession, this is much less of a
concern and should not trump considerations of how subsidies perform under more
normal circumstances.
99. AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: HOMES FOR A DIVERSE NATION, supra note
12, at 22. The report describes the problem of smaller properties at risk for removal:
Over the ten years beginning in 1993, an estimated 2.3 million rental units (6
percent) were demolished or otherwise permanently removed from the inven
tory. Over half of these rentals were in older (built before 1960) one- to fourfamily buildings located in the nation’s most distressed neighborhoods . . . . As
might be expected, loss rates are higher for properties with such additional
risk factors as low rent, long-term vacancies, and structural deficiencies. For
older, smaller multifamily units, these added risk factors push the loss rate to
13 percent. Combining all the risk factors, including structural inadequacy,
pushes the loss rate to over 20 percent.
Id. In gentrifying communities, rental housing may be taken out of service in order to
convert it to condominiums. See generally Hans Lind & Anders Hellström, Gentrifica
tion—An Overview of the Literature (Div. of Bldg. & Real Estate Econ., Working Paper
No. 38, 2003), available at http://www.kth.se/polopoly_fs/1.19799!38.pdf.
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fate of the privately owned, unsubsidized rental stock that serves
the vast majority of low-income renter households.”100 Because fi
nancing costs are typically the biggest expense for multifamily
properties, “issues related to the costs and availability of mortgage
funds have important implications for the overall affordability of
rental housing.”101
While the affordability problem is uncontroversial and well
documented, it is unclear that the best solution for it is to reduce
the financing costs of these landlords of last resort. Before under
taking the Joint Center approach, one must be confident that land
lords will pass on these savings to their tenants and reverse the
trend of shrinking the affordable housing stock. In other words, if
the benefits of the reduction in landlord financing costs are in
tended to trickle down to tenants, one should be certain as to its
rate of flow.102
James Follain and Edward Szymanoski challenge responses to
the affordability problem like that of the Joint Center: “[I]t is wise
to consider the relative importance of multifamily mortgage credit
subsidy programs in an overall strategy to improve the delivery of
housing services to low-income households.”103 They argue that,
for a variety of reasons, “[t]hese subsidy programs should not rank
very high.”104
First, they argue that there is insufficient empirical evidence to
support the argument for supply-side subsidies.105 Second, they ar
gue that an unacceptable portion of the subsidy flows to the hous
ing providers and related industries.106 Third, they argue that many
supply-side subsidies are subject to improper political
interference.107
100. AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: HOMES FOR A DIVERSE NATION, supra note
12, at 21-22 (also noting that this “affordable inventory consists primarily of singlefamily and small multifamily units”).
101. Schnare, supra note 22, at 4.
102. Cf. WINNICK, supra note 38, at 172 (noting that indirect government aids for
rental housing “must be channeled through the hands of an intermediary—the private
investor” and that “[c]onstant vigilance and strict regulation are required to insure that
benefits will not be absorbed before they reach the intended beneficiary”).
103. Follain & Szymanoski, supra note 33, at 173.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 174.
106. Id.
107. Id. (arguing that “[d]emand-side programs are less prone to this type of
abuse in competitive markets for rental housing, which seems to be the typical
situation”).
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Follain clearly outlines the argument against a “trickle down,”
supply-side subsidized multifamily mortgage policy, based on a fun
damental question: what is the price elasticity of the housing sup
ply?108 If the housing supply is elastic, then tenants may benefit
from reductions in the cost of providing the housing.109 But if it is
inelastic, “the primary beneficiaries of such programs are likely to
be builders, investors, and other supply-side agents.”110 This is be
cause reducing production costs for an inelastic supply should not
result in price reductions—only an elastic and increasing supply
would have such a result.111 As the housing economics literature
has not yet determined whether the housing supply is elastic, it is
dangerous to implement public policy based on the assumption that
it is.112
After noting the limitations inherent in such supply-side,
trickle-down policies, Follain and Szymanoski close their argument
by pointing to the existence of more efficient solutions to some of
the problems that a mortgage finance subsidy is intended to ad
dress.113 One such solution, for instance, would be to pursue poli
cies that directly benefit low- and moderate-income households and
are targeted to reduce housing costs for tenants. Section 8, tenant

108. Follain, supra note 10, at 543.
109. Elasticity of housing supply depends in turn on a variety of local factors,
including rent, zoning, land use, and building regulations.
110. Follain, supra note 10, at 544. See EDWARD L. GLAESER & JOSEPH
GYOURKO, RETHINKING FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY 64-81 (2008), for a discussion of
the extreme variability of elasticity among American housing submarkets that results
from variations in local land use regulation.
111. For example, if housing supply is elastic, developers would build more hous
ing if it became profitable to do so as a result of decreased financing costs. This is
because financing costs are a major element of overall housing cost.
112. Follain, supra note 10, at 544. Of course there is a certain amount of waste
in any subsidy that does not involve a direct income transfer. If one were only choosing
among producer subsidies, one must compare their comparative inefficiencies.
113. Id. Follain and Szymanoski suggest that
the complexity of multifamily lending can be reduced by simplifying the rules
and regulations surrounding nonprofit housing development organizations.
Local governments can also be encouraged to develop housing codes that are
more accommodating to projects for low-income households. Another idea
usually favored by economists is a well-structured demand-side voucher pro
gram that encourages recipients to search the market for good and affordable
housing. This type of subsidy program is usually simpler to implement than
subsidized lending programs and is more likely to be successful.
Id.; see Ellickson, supra note 94 (comparing efficacy of vouchers to inclusionary
programs).
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based rent vouchers are the most well known of such subsidies.114
One could achieve similar results by providing a tax credit for rent
payments by low- and moderate-income families. Ultimately, the
concerns set forth by Follain and Szymanoski regarding multifamily
mortgage subsidy programs in general must be addressed before a
federal or state government should implement a new program of
subsidized, multifamily mortgage finance for small buildings in
particular.
B. The Market Failure Rationale
Follain and Szymanoski also explore “market failure” as an al
ternate rationale for government intervention in the multifamily
mortgage sector.115 In particular, they note that
[i]t is difficult to make a case for government intervention in the
multifamily mortgage market when using the standard model of
market failure, given the efficiencies of modern financial mar
kets. The case for intervention in the financial markets, if one is
to be made, is more subtle and requires a model in which uncer
tainty about some future events—for example, mortgage de
faults—is explicit. Market failure in models with uncertainty is
caused by two broad categories of factors in the credit markets:
uninsurable risks and information costs.116

The question, then, is whether the small multifamily mortgage
market suffers from uncertainty because of uninsurable risks or in
114. See generally RICHARD HILTON ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE MARK-TO
MARKET PROGRAM 1 (2004), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/
M2MEva.pdf. The authors note,
In 1974, Congress enacted Section 8 “Lower Income Rental Assistance” under
the United States Housing Act, a program that could be either project-based
or tenant-based. Rather than providing a fixed subsidy, tenants would gener
ally pay 25 percent of their income (later increased to 30 percent) towards
their rent and the government would pay the difference.
Id.
115. Follain & Szymanoski, supra note 33, at 154. The authors describe a market
failure as follows:
[W]hen the market does not provide the quantity of a particular good or ser
vice at which the marginal social benefits of another unit equal the marginal
social costs of producing that unit. In such a situation, the benefits to society
of having one more unit exceed the costs of producing one more unit; thus, a
rationale exists for some level of government to intervene in the market and
expand the output of this good.
Id.
116. Id.; see Vandell, supra note 10, at 322 (arguing that the most compelling
argument “for government involvement in multifamily finance comes by way overcom
ing information voids”).
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formation costs. While researchers in the 1980s and 1990s found
that there was not enough information for multifamily mortgage
underwriters to make informed decisions,117 this seems to be much
less the case today.118 To the extent that there is a market failure in
the multifamily mortgage market, it is caused in part by the large
number of originators in the small multifamily submarket. Such a
low-concentration market increases transaction costs for secondary
market investors seeking to conduct due diligence on many mort
gages with different terms. As opposed to the RMBS market, there
is a great deal of variety in multifamily mortgage documents, which
increases due diligence and legal review costs for underwriters and
securitizers.119
A final question is, if one were to generally support multi
family mortgage subsidies, whether smaller multifamily buildings
should be subsidized at the expense of larger buildings. This is an
important issue in the debate over whether to provide new supports
for this housing stock, as smaller multifamily buildings may be less

117. See, e.g., Amy D. Crews et al., The Distribution of Multifamily Mortgage
Originations: What We Know and Why We Care, 6 J. HOUSING ECON. 334, 365 (1997)
(“Without better information, further development of a secondary multifamily mort
gage market is likely to go slowly and lag far behind the single-family mortgage mar
ket.”); Schneider & Follain, supra note 52, at 49-50 (“[R]esearch indicates that small
projects make up a niche market that is difficult and uneconomical to serve through
standard multifamily lending practices.”).
118. AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POL
ICY, supra note 3, at 14.
119. See, e.g., Schneider & Follain, supra note 52, at 50. The authors note,
The costs to investors of due diligence on nonstandardized loan pools of small
project mortgages eliminate many pricing advantages of a structured transac
tion. Efforts to increase standardization could secure more access to efficient
sources of long-term capital. However, standardization may prove difficult to
accomplish because of the heterogeneity of small project borrowers and the
flexibility required to underwrite small project loans.
Id.; see also Jean L. Cummings, Developing a Secondary Market for Affordable Rental
Housing: Lessons from the LIMAC/Freddie Mac and EMI/Fannie Mae Programs, 4 CI
TYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 19, 20 (1998) (“An active secondary market requires
standardization of the mortgage contract, underwriting and mortgage documents”). In
January 2009, the Joint Center made a related market failure argument—that private
lenders exit the multifamily market during credit crises and government instrumentali
ties such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are needed to provide liquidity. MEETING
MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS, supra note 2, at 5. Given the problems faced
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac during the current credit crisis, this argument is less
than compelling. See David Reiss, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Future of Fed
eral Housing Finance Policy: A Study of Regulatory Privilege, 61 ALA. L. REV. (forth
coming 2010), available at http://works.bepress.com/david_reiss/25.
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efficient providers of affordable housing than larger ones.120 To an
swer that question, one should compare the cost of subsidizing a
unit of a small multifamily building to prevent it from being taken
out of service to the cost of subsidizing a unit of a large multifamily
building to prevent it from being taken out of service. In all likeli
hood, it is more efficient to preserve the unit in the larger build
ing.121 After all, large buildings bring to bear an economy of scale
120. William Apgar and Shekar Narasimhan argue that the smaller units in par
ticular should be preserved. For example:
With new construction focused on expanding the supply of more expensive
apartments in large multifamily structures, the ongoing demolition and inven
tory losses of rental units in older small multifamily structures is rapidly de
pleting the available supply of affordable rental housing. Most of the
privately-owned small multifamily rental stock was built at least 30 years ago
when construction techniques and capital markets were less sophisticated and
households were less affluent. Much of this inventory is now in need of sub
stantial repair. According to the American Housing Survey, 3 million private
market rental units have severe structural deficiencies and are at risk of loss.
APGAR & NARASIMHAN, supra note 1, at 6. In addition to the criticisms set forth in the
text above, Apgar and Narasimhan fail to explicitly address the filtering process that
occurs as newer, more expensive units are added to the existing housing stock and the
extent to which that addition to the overall housing supply offsets inventory losses of
older, small multifamily units. See Matthew Edel, Filtering in a Private Housing Mar
ket, in READINGS IN URBAN ECONOMICS 204, 204 (Matthew Edel & Jerome Rothen
berg eds., 1972) (defining filtering). They also fail to account for the fact that
developments in the housing finance market such as the FHA–insured mortgage have
allowed “the average developer to build on a larger scale.” WINNICK, supra note 38, at
159.
121. In order to study whether smaller buildings are less efficient tools for pre
serving affordable housing, one would need to control for the quality of the housing
provided by smaller and larger buildings. Once that is done, it is very likely that the
finding would be that larger buildings are more efficient. See THE STATE OF THE NA
TION’S HOUSING (2006), supra note 9, at 22 (noting that over the 1990s and 2000s “new
multifamily rental construction has shifted decidedly toward larger structures”). A fur
ther consideration is whether lower-density housing has positive externalities that
should factor into any discussion of subsidizing small apartment buildings. This appears
to be a largely unexplored area of study. There have been numerous studies, however,
that evaluate the individual and community benefits of residential homeownership, as
compared to rental tenancy. See, e.g., ROBERT D. DIETZ, THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
OF HOMEOWNERSHIP (Homeownership Alliance, 2003), available at www.newtowncdc.
org/pdf/social_consequences_study.pdf (surveying existing scholarship drawn from so
cial sciences, medicine, psychology, and other academic fields). Additionally, there is
scholarship comparing the economic and health outcomes of moving families from
high-poverty neighborhoods to low-poverty areas. See Jeffrey Kling et al., Moving to
Opportunity and Tranquility: Neighborhood Effects on Adult Economic Self-Sufficiency
and Health from a Randomized Housing Voucher Experiment 4-5 (Harvard Univ. John
F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP04-035, 2004),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=588942 (finding significant mental health benefits,
some physical benefits, and no substantial economic benefits from participation in hous
ing mobility program). It remains, however, a completely open question whether hous
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that will tend to make them run more efficiently.122 In either case,
however, if the housing supply is relatively inelastic it is unlikely
that even a generally available subsidy for multifamily properties is
an efficient way to reduce the rate of loss to the affordable multi
family housing supply.123 The imposition of some form of rent reg
ulation on the subsidized housing would be necessary to ensure that
it remained affordable.124
Apgar and Narasimhan have given form to the repeated calls
by housing advocates to subsidize financing costs for small apart
ment buildings. To give this proposal its due, it does attempt to
address aspects of the efficiency argument. To that end, Apgar and
Narasimhan argue that the proposal would “facilitate the ownership
transfer of the critically important small-multifamily rental inven
tory from individual owner to institutional investor, and in doing so
help gain needed scale economies to reduce the costs of property
management, repair and maintenance.”125 It is highly uncertain,
however, whether the economies of scale contemplated by such a
model would in fact be achieved: one private company that be
ing density alone, controlling for all other factors, has an impact on residents sufficient
to prioritize subsidies for small apartment buildings over those for larger buildings.
122. See MEETING MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS, supra note 2, at 2
(citing efficiencies in delivering social services, improving physical infrastructure, and
achieving energy independence and sustainable development goals via multifamily
communities versus single-family housing). It is reasonable to assume that such effi
ciencies would be amplified, to some degree, in larger-scale multifamily housing. Apgar
and Narasimhan readily admit that “[a]vailable evidence suggests the presence of signif
icant economies of scale in the operation of larger buildings.” Apgar & Narasimhan,
supra note 1, at 22. Indeed, the heart of their proposal is to duplicate the efficiencies of
larger buildings by pooling smaller properties. Id. at 21-24, 28. However, as argued
above, there are more efficient means of promoting the overarching goal of affordable
housing.
123. Notwithstanding this concern about the small multifamily market, it is not
unreasonable to conclude, along with James Follain and Edward Szymanoski, that
“standard contracts and data systems are public goods and government may want to
invest in their development.” Follain & Szymanoski, supra note 33, at 161. Such an
investment would obviously be much more modest than an ongoing subsidy to land
lords themselves.
124. To be clear, Apgar and Narasimhan’s S-REIT proposal does not call for
mandatory subsidized rents or tenant income limits on the units owned by the S-REIT.
While writing that affordability could be enhanced by combining the S-REIT program
with rental subsidies, at base the program relies on market mechanisms to preserve
affordable housing: “Even without subsidy, the [S-REIT] approach would help stem the
loss of many small multifamily properties. In doing [so,] it alleviates the ongoing pres
sure on market rents that undermine the well being of the nation’s lowest income rent
ers.” Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 27.
125. Apgar, supra note 90, at 55.
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lieved that it could achieve such economies of scale has found that
it is much more difficult than it had foreseen.126
CONCLUSION
While it is incontrovertible that small-apartment-building own
ers are not all slumlords and social parasites, the argument in favor
of subsidizing the financing costs for such property owners has not
been won. At best, its proponents might argue that it is a realpoli
tik response to the fact that direct subsidies to the poor are politi
cally impractical, so it is better to support an industry—the housing
industry—that provides services to the poor and is organized
enough to defend those subsidies.127
For a more principled defense, proponents of small-apartment
building subsidy programs will need to respond to the concerns out
lined above: is it a relatively efficient subsidy? Is it responding to a
market failure? Those who favor such subsidies appear to have suc
cumbed to a logical fallacy: they argue that because small buildings
provide affordable housing and are at risk of loss, the most efficient
way to protect affordable housing is to preserve these small build
ings. For the reasons outlined above, that conclusion does not fol
low: the indiscriminate subsidy of financing costs for the owners of
small multifamily buildings has not been demonstrated to be good
public policy. More carefully targeted uses of government subsidies
are therefore warranted to achieve housing affordability for lowand moderate-income households.

126. See James R. Hagerty, Beware the Foreclosure Allure—Redbrick’s Model of
Scattered Bets Is Cautionary Tale, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2008, at C19 (noting that pri
vate-sector investor in scattered small apartment buildings did not achieve economies
of scale but, rather, faced high costs).
127. Ellickson, supra note 94, at 30-31.

R

